Security & Defence Cooperation in the Post-Brexit Era
Lawrence Kettle: The European Union and the United Kingdom: Security & Defence Cooperation in the Post-Brexit Era. AIES Studies 1/2024.
16.09.2024
The United Kingdom’s (UK) departure from the European Union (EU), more commonly referred to as Brexit caused a significant rift between Brussels and London. Years of negotiation, and the rhetoric of anti-EU Brexiteer politicians damaged the EU-UK relationship, and it seemed as if cooperation between the two parties would be filled with friction, stagnation and division. However, despite the rift caused by Brexit the one policy area that showed growth and cooperation has been in the area of European security and defence and the UK’s commitment to the defence of the continent of Europe.
The first UK Government strategy came one year after the UK left the EU, and was published in March 2021. The Global Britain in a competitive age; The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, abbreviated to IR2021 caused concern in Europe. Whilst it made various reassurances that the UK was committed to European security, it also stated that the UK was also going to “tilt” toward the Indo-Pacific, desiring to become much more engaged in the region. The corresponding Defence Command Paper also published in 2021 confirmed that the UK would seek to deploy greater diplomatic, military and financial assets to the region. It was this post-Brexit policy that caused great concern in Europe; as many analysts and policy makers believed that the UK would have to withdraw and redeploy some, or certainly a sizeable number, of its assets from Europe in order to focus on the Indo-Pacific. The use of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Brexit rhetoric, the fact that both documents lacked referring to the EU as a security actor, or even at all, and the insistence of dealing with European security only via NATO or bilaterally further caused consternation within the EU.
However, the British Government’s strategic approach to European security in its 2021 policy document severely hampered their diplomatic and strategic manoeuvrability, as the UK was dealing with EU Member States whose commitment is to develop and strengthen the EU’s own security infrastructure. A severe limitation, among others, that would render the strategy effectively irrelevant one year later.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 radically changed Europe’s security and defence architecture leaving the British strategy now out-of-date. In March 2023 the British Government, now under Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, relaunched its strategy entitled Integrated Review Refresh 2023; Responding to a more contested and volatile world, abbreviated to IR2023. This strategy and the accompanying Defence Command Paper removed all of the Johnson era Brexit slogans, toned down the emphasis on the Indo-Pacific “tilt”, and gave far more reassurances to Europe that Britain was committed to European defence. Yet, despite more friendly overtones and even stating it wanted to work with the EU’s PESCO initiative, the strategy still revolved around the same Johnson era approach of dealing with European security primally through NATO and bilaterally. This resulted in limitations, that still hampered the UK’s abilities as before. However, with the election of the new British Government under Labour in July 2024, and the promise of a new EU-UK security pact, it is hoped that the new government will remove some of the restraints and limitations that have hindered Britain since it left the EU in 2020.
This report not only examines the key British Government strategies and their weaknesses; it extrapolates information from other government documents, statements and agreements to illustrate how the UK has approached European security since leaving the EU.
This report is designed to be an all encompassing one-stop shop for policymakers, government officials, and researchers so as to gain a detailed insight into the evolution of British security and defence policy in Europe, and where the new government could develop UK policy to shore up gaps and weaknesses.
The regions of Northern Europe, the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe (particularity Ukraine and the Baltic states), and the Eastern Mediterranean were identified as the most important geostrategic areas in Europe that the UK is focusing on; and it is here that the UK Government will continue to deploy the majority of its military, diplomatic and financial assets in Europe. With regards to bilateral relations with EU Member States, the UK has significant security and defence agreements with France, Germany, Poland, and Italy that cover a broad range of issues. But the UK also has agreements with other Member States such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and other European countries for specific geostrategic challenges of importance to the UK.
The British Government have been successful in confronting prominent security challenges in Europe, such as helping the Ukrainians fight back against the Russian invasion, reinforcing British military presence in the Baltic states and Poland, and increasing British efforts in the Western Balkans. However, the current approach, a legacy of Johnson’s administration, is still very restrictive and very limiting; especially as the EU is increasing its efforts to be a far more integrated and effective security actor. Not to mention that EU Member States are restricted by EU law in how or what they can do with a third country outside of the Union.
It is therefore the recommendation of this report that the new British Government negotiates with the European Union a comprehensive EU-UK agreement on foreign, security and defence policy, as was originally planned in the EU-UK Political Declaration of 2019 which was rejected in the end by Johnson.