Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies

Development Aid, Migration and Conditionality

The Case of the Marshall Plan with Africa

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Summary[1]

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This policy brief analyses the current efforts by the EU and its member states to provide development aid to third countries. It concentrates on the Marshall Plan with Africa. Proposed by Germany, this plan is intended to bring cooperation between Europe and Africa to a new level. The study examines this plan in light of debates on the impact of development aid on third countries in general, and on migratory dynamics in particular. The specific focus is on aid conditionality related to cooperation on migration. The brief shows that increasing development aid does not necessarily lead to a decrease in migration. The available evidence suggests that conditionality in the provision of development aid is not effective in reducing the propensity to migrate.

The policy brief makes recommendations for future EU–Africa cooperation, in the hope that mistakes which have repeatedly been made can be avoided. It recommends that, to ensure a regular dialogue between the two continents, Africa should remain high on the agendas of both the EU and the member states. To decrease irregular migration, legal pathways should be created and the struggle against smuggling networks should be stepped up. Migration-related conditions should be attached to the provision of development aid only with

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caution. Aid ought to be primarily targeted at creating good governance and strengthening public services.

The views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author. They are not necessarily shared by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies or the European People's Party.

Keywords Marshall Plan with Africa – Migration – Development aid – Irregular migration – Readmission agreements – Partnership frameworks

EU development aid is increasingly being directed at curbing migration

In 2015 more than 1.3 million refugees and migrants arrived in the EU.[2] In the two years that followed, this trend continued, a decrease becoming noticeable only from 2017 onwards. In response, EU external policy has focused since 2015 on tackling the migration crisis by stopping the arrival of migrants, in particular by addressing the root causes of migration.

The Union has increasingly been basing its migration policy on the assumption that enhanced development cooperation with third countries will contribute to reducing migration flows.[3] The EU's political agenda has also been oriented towards reducing migration by supporting returns and cooperating on border management.[4] While it is true that, given the current low numbers of migrants entering their territories, the member states can no longer speak about a 'migration crisis' in the strict sense of the term, migration is a phenomenon that will be with us for decades. Africa's population reached 1.3 billion in 2017 and is expected to double by 2050, to approximately 2.5 billion.[5] The working-age population of Africa is predicted to grow from 480 million in 2013 to about 1.3 billion in 2050, and this age group is the group that feeds migration the most.[6] Moreover, given

2 *Pew Research Centre*, 'Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015', 2 August 2016.

3 M. Latek, *Interlinks Between Migration and Development*, European Parliamentary Research Service (2019).

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 J. Gonzalez-Garcia and M. Mlachila, 'Africa's Population Is Growing Quickly. And It's on the Move', *World Economic Forum*, 9 November 2016.

Europe's geographical position[7] and the standard of living it offers, even more migrants will be driven to reach its borders.[8]

After the urgency created by the flood of refugees and migrants in 2015, the EU acknowledged the need to introduce new migration policies. This was strongly motivated by the pressure to curb migration; and this, in turn, has had the effect of elevating the risk of diverting development aid from its core purposes.[9] Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty states that 'the Union's development cooperation shall have as its primary objective the reduction, and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty'. Despite the provisions of the treaty, the EU's development policy has been shifting from its traditional focus to a more complex configuration whereby conditions related to migration management are tied to the granting of aid.[10]

Conditionality in development aid: an ongoing discussion

The debate on the merits of making development aid conditional on cooperation on migration has not been settled. Different opinions are being voiced. Official documents of the European People's Party (EPP) have lately favoured making development aid conditional on third countries' cooperating with the EU on migration. (The EU's centre–right has also called for making EU visa policies dependent on such cooperation on migration, a subject that is not covered in the present paper).[11]

The existing trend towards attaching migration policy conditions to development aid has been subject to criticism. For example, in 2016 the European Parliament responded that addressing the current migration challenges should be done without jeopardising development policy objectives.[12] According to the Parliament, all development financial instruments, such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa, on which see below), should comply with the official development

[7] European Parliament, 'The Population of African and Sub-Saharan African Countries in 2050, Migration Flows and the EU's Urgent Need to Draw Up a Marshall Plan for Africa', question by Carmen Avram (S&D) (22 July 2019).

[8] Center for Global Development, *Building an EU–Africa Partnership of Equals: A Roadmap for the New European Leadership* (Washington, DC, 2019).

[9] CONCORD Europe, *Aid and Migration: The Externalisation of Europe's Responsibilities* (2018).

[10] M. Latek, *Growing Impact of EU Migration Policy on Development Cooperation*, European Parliamentary Research Service (2016).

[11] EPP, 'Let's Open the Next Chapter for Europe Together', text of the EPP Manifesto for the European Parliament elections in 2019, adopted at the EPP Political Assembly, Brussels, 20 March 2019 (n.d), 7.

[12] Latek, *Growing Impact of EU Migration Policy on Development Cooperation*.

assistance (ODA) criteria.[13] ODA is defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee as 'government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries.'[14]

According to another critical voice, that of Oxfam, 'the allocation of aid to partner countries should not be made conditional upon their cooperation with the EU's demands regarding returns and readmission or border management'.[15] However, the design of the EUTF clearly includes such conditionality.

In the case of Niger, a study by CONCORD (European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development) shows that EUTF funding is tied to conditions related to migration control. Half of all the EUTF support granted to Niger is given to local authorities to reduce migration. The local actors involved fear that the projects might have only a limited impact on the development of the country and have raised concerns about the selection procedure, the monitoring and evaluation process, and the overall coherence of the funded activities. They argue that the EU should adjust its EUTF activities in Niger so that they become more effective and contribute to good governance.

In the case of Ethiopia, it can be demonstrated that EUTF funding is conditional upon fulfilling one top priority, the enhancing of cooperation in the field of returns and readmission. Unlike those in Niger, EUTF projects in Ethiopia focus on development and are to some extent in line with the principles of development aid. However, there is a risk that this could change in the near future, as the EUTF may be used as a means to achieve increased returns and readmissions. The concern arises that the EUTF may become a political tool that is focused on short-term projects aimed at curbing migration to Europe, in violation of what the Lisbon Treaty stipulates concerning the use of ODA.[16]

The matter of conditionality was addressed by Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policies (2014–19), when she stated that moves towards setting conditions for granting aid have to meet all legal standards and cannot run counter to fundamental EU principles.[17] In a 2015 document the Commission acknowledged this and stated 'that

13 Ibid.

14 *OECD*, 'Official Development Assistance (ODA)' (n.d.).

15 OXFAM, *The EU Trust Fund for Africa: Trapped Between Aid Policy and Migration Politics* (Oxford, 2020).

16 CONCORD Europe, *Partnership or Conditionality? Monitoring the Migration Compacts and EU Trust Fund for Africa* (2018).

17 M. Funk et al., *Tackling Irregular Migration Through Development – A Flawed Approach?*, European Policy Centre (2017), 3.

the use of conditionality in the migration dialogue should not negatively impact development cooperation'.[18] According to Martin Hofmann, a political analyst at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 'strict conditionality' should be viewed with scepticism and does not work in the long run.[19] Making development aid conditional upon the tightening of borders, for example, would not stop migration but would lead to migrants taking even more dangerous routes to reach their destinations.[20] Other analysts, too, have stated that the eradication of poverty should remain the main aim of the EU's development cooperation with third countries, as is required by the Lisbon Treaty.[21]

Steps towards setting migration-related conditions for the provision of development aid

As mentioned above, since 2015 the EU has been reinforcing its migration and asylum policies and establishing new financial instruments focused on Africa.[22] In 2015 the Commission issued its European Agenda on Migration. And the Valletta summit, held in November 2015, represented an important milestone in the establishment of the EUTF.[23]

Despite the criticism, the EUTF continues to be used to accomplish effective migrant returns and readmissions, and to enhance synergies between migration and development.[24] A perusal of the projects approved under this fund reveals that money is being allocated for purposes such as fighting irregular migration and countering the smuggling and trafficking of migrants.[25] The EUTF's initial budget was €1.8 billion,[26] with funding coming from the EU budget and the European Development Fund. By 2019, €4.2 billion had been pledged to pursue its activities, including €3.7 billion from the European Development Fund and from EU financial instruments—including the Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Neighbourhood Instrument—and from the Commission's

18 Latek, *Growing Impact of EU Migration Policy*, 5.

19 M. Hofmann, interview by the author, 2 July 2019.

20 Funk et al., *Tackling Irregular Migration Through Development*, 3.

21 Ibid.

22 Latek, *Growing Impact of EU Migration Policy*.

23 Ibid.

24 European Commission, Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, *Where We Work* (2019).

25 Funk et al., *Tackling Irregular Migration Through Development.*

26 V. D'Humières, *European Union/African Cooperation: The Externalisation of Europe's Migration Policies*, Robert Schuman Foundation, European Issues no. 472 (2018).

Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs and Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. The member states have contributed to these activities a total of €492 million.[27] According to Oxfam's research, which covered the period November 2015 to May 2019, financial support for development cooperation accounted for 56% of EUTF funding (€2.18 billion); support for migration governance, 26% (€1.011 billion); peace and security components, 10% (€382 million); and research and education projects, 2% (€83.1 million).[28]

Another instrument, the EU's External Investment Plan, was adopted in September 2017, having been set up to stimulate investment in Africa and in the neighbouring countries of the EU by leveraging private investment. It pools together €4.1 billion from the European Commission into the European Fund for Sustainable Development.[29]

German proposals

It is not only at the supranational level that one finds a greater commitment to finding effective ways to cooperate with the neighbouring continent in the form of new financial instruments or initiatives.[30] In recent years the most prominent national actor in this area, Germany, has played a leading role, developing several initiatives directed at helping African countries. In 2017 the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy presented its Pro!Africa initiative, which is aimed at strengthening stability and development on the continent.[31]

However, the initiative that has received the most attention from the other member states is the Marshall Plan With Africa (MPA),[32] which was inspired by the Marshall Plan established by the US after the Second World War.[33] The plan was drawn up by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und

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27 European Commission, 'State of Play and Financial Resources', *EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa*, updated 26 March 2020.

28 OXFAM, *The EU Trust Fund for Africa*.

29 S. Bilal, 'Can Africa and Europe Jointly Walk the Talk on Investment Mobilisation?', *ECDPM*, 27 November 2017.

30 M. Grzanna, 'Warten auf den Afrika-Fonds', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27 March 2019.

31 D. Pelz, 'Deutschlands neuer Plan für Afrika', *Deutsche Welle*, 27 March 2019.

32 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Africa and Europe – A New Partnership for Development, Peace and a Better Future* (2017); see also S. Elouazi, 'A Marshall Plan to Slow Migration: EU to Invest 40 Billion in Africa', *Morocco World News*, 31 October 2017.

33 F. Nwaiwu, 'Europe's Marshall Plan for Africa. Will It Work?', *Siro 360*, 26 March 2018.

Entwicklung, BMZ) and was presented at the 2017 G20 summit[34] in Hamburg, where Germany promoted a new Africa policy.[35] Although originating in Germany, this plan is intended to include all of Europe and the entire African continent, as its name, the 'Marshall Plan With Africa' suggests.[36] The areas on which the plan intends to place increased focus are agriculture, food security, energy, social security, health, infrastructure and education.[37] To fulfil its purpose, the plan provides for approximately €40 billion in strategic investment.

More aid does not necessarily lead to less migration

European leaders and institutions often advocate the idea that providing more development aid to African countries will decrease migration flows. The key role of development aid in curbing migration was also highlighted in the EU's European Agenda on Migration (2015), as well as in the Partnership Framework with Third Countries on Migration (2016).[38] But questions have been raised about this strong correlation between development cooperation and migration management. And these questions, in turn, cast doubt on the effectiveness of the approach.

Within academic circles[39] it is well known that up to a certain level of income per capita, socio-economic development increases migration instead of reducing it.[40] It is therefore misleading when policymakers claim that increasing development aid will stop migration.[41] This can be explained as follows.

The cost of migrating is high: €1,500–€2,500 to go from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. A greater availability of money enhances the means at people's disposal to finance the migratory journey. In most African countries, the money needed is greater than an individual's income for two years. This means that most migrants

34 German Federal Government, 'The G20 Presidency 2017 at a Glance' (2017).

35 P. Morazan and I. Knoke, *Der Marshallplan mit Afrika: Kleiner aber einseitiger Schritt in die richtige Richtung*, Südwind (Bonn, 2017).

36 B. Beyers et al., *Migration, Nachhaltigkeit und ein Marshall Plan mit Afrika*, Club of Rome und Senat Der Wirtschaft (2016).

37 W. Schonecke, *Marshall Plan and Compact with Africa: A Critical New Comment on the New EU–Africa Partnerships*, Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network (2017).

38 H. T. Arroyo, *Using Aid to Address the Root Causes of Migration and Refugee Flows*, European University Institute (2019).

39 H. De Haas, 'The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes: A Theoretical Inquiry', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36/10 (2010).

40 Ibid.

41 A. Koch, A. Weber and I. Werenfels (eds.), *Profiteers of Migration? Authoritarian States in Africa and European Migration Management*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Research Paper 4 (Berlin, 2018).

who have the resources to migrate are employed. The higher the poverty level migrants face, the shorter the distances they can migrate. Intercontinental migration is only realistic for the richer population or for those who make the journey over a longer period of time and thus can stop to work.[42] This view of the issue is supported by research conducted by Berthélemy and Beuran[43] and by Clemens.[44] These studies reveal that economic growth has little capacity to deter migration.

The income differentials between Africa and Europe boost the propensity to migrate until poor countries' GDP per capita reaches €7,150–€8,950. Were today's poorest countries to continue growing at their historical growth rate, it would take until 2198 for their GDP per capita to reach €7,150. If foreign aid were used to increase economic growth by 1% annually, it would take until 2097 to reach this level. This shows that any aid currently directed at third countries to deter migration is not sufficient and would have to be sustained for at least three generations. According to Clemens and Postel, achieving an annual growth rate of 1% would require aid equivalent to 10% of GDP.[45]

One sees, then, that in poor countries enhanced development can fuel migration. The additional income encourages families to invest in making the journey, which they would not be able to undertake otherwise. Data shows that all countries that moved to the middle-income level in 1960–2013 experienced a significant rise in emigration.[46] The above argument is in large part supported by the study *The Impact of Foreign Aid on Migration* by Lanati and Thiele.[47] The authors set forth the hypothesis of a 'hump-shaped migration', a pattern of migration which can be explained as follows.

On the one hand, the Income Channel hypothesis suggests that aid increases incomes, which then reduces migration. On the other hand, the Budgetary Constraint Channel hypothesis suggests that enhanced wealth can serve as an additional means of financing the costs of migration. Combining these two hypotheses results in a third hypothesis according to which migration takes on the shape of a hump. As described by the authors, 'at very low levels of income per

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42 Latek, *Interlinks Between Migration and Development*.

43 J. Berthélemy and M. Beuran, 'Aid and Migration: Substitutes or Complements?', *World Development* 37/10 (2009).

44 M. A. Clemens, *Does Development Reduce Migration?*, IZA, Discussion paper no. 8592 (Bonn, 2014).

45 The points made in this paragraph are based on Clemens and Postel, *Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid: An Overview of Evidence from Low-Income Countries*, IZA, Policy paper no. 136 (Bonn, 2017).

46 Ibid.

47 M. Lanati and R. Thiele, *The Impact of Foreign Aid on Migration Revisited*, European University Institute, MWP 2017/05 (Florence, 2017), 2.

capita, growth spurs migration by allowing poor migrants to afford the migration related costs (the Budgetary Constraint Channel dominates), whereas at higher levels of income per capita the Income Channel becomes prevailing relative to the Budgetary Constraint Channel'.[48] The basic point, then, is that at low levels of GDP, increasing income will lead to a rise in migration.[49] Therefore, the correlation between development and migration in this case shows that enhanced economic growth and increased income levels help a country to emerge from its low-income status, and when this is accomplished, emigration increases.[50] Emigration only starts to decrease when a specific level of socio-economic development is reached, that is, when people's income rises to the upper-middle-income level. For example, Niger and Chad are very poor countries, and it would take them up to one hundred years to reach this level.[51]

It should be noted here that development aid can have negative consequences in countries affected by civil conflicts. This happens when rebel groups and governments shift aid funds from production and use them to finance conflicts.[52] South Sudan is a prominent example of a conflict-riven country where increased aid has caused more migration.[53]

There are several factors in addition to those already discussed that influence the complex relationship between development aid and migration. According to some authors,[54] targeted aid can in some cases turn out to be effective in decreasing migration: this holds where the right kind of aid is complemented by relevant policies and suitably coordinated among donors.[55] Lanati and Thiele[56] contend that humanitarian emergency assistance leads to increased migration, whereas aid directed towards the strengthening of the quality of public services and social infrastructure can help decrease migration.[57]

48 Ibid.

49 Lanati and Thiele, *The Impact of Foreign Aid on Migration Revisited*.

50 A. Angenendt, C. P. Martin-Shields and B. Schraven, *More Development – More Migration? The 'Migration Hump' and Its Significance for Development Policy Co-Operation with Sub-Saharan Africa*, German Development Institute, Briefing Paper 20/2017 (Bonn, 2017).

51 Ibid.

52 K. R. Camarena, *Using Foreign Aid to Prevent Migrant Flows From Ongoing Conflicts*, *Scholars at Harvard*, May 2017.

53 Ibid.

54 J. Gamso and Y. Farhod, 'Targeted Foreign Aid and International Migration: Is Development-Promotion an Effective Immigration Policy?', *International Studies Quarterly* 62/4 (2018); Arroyo, *Using Aid to Address the Root Causes of Migration and Refugee Flows*.

55 Arroyo, *Using Aid to Address the Root Causes of Migration and Refugee Flows*.

56 Lanati and Thiele, *The Impact of Foreign Aid on Migration Revisited*, 2.

57 See also Arroyo, *Using Aid to Address the Root Causes of Migration and Refugee Flows*.

The Marshall Plan with Africa and other new policies: old strategies or breakthrough approaches?

Africa and Europe are interlinked as neighbouring continents that face a shared future. The successful tackling of Africa's challenges will also affect the future of Europe. Therefore, both continents need close cooperation to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. As mentioned above, 2017 was marked by a redefinition of the EU's cooperation with Africa and by Germany's efforts to introduce an innovative approach and bring new solutions to Africa's problems.[58] For the first time the G20 summit focused on Africa. Germany's BMZ proposed the MPA, which represented a paradigm shift in how the EU cooperates with its African partners. Under this plan, there is a move away from the concepts of donor and recipient countries to the idea of enhanced joint economic cooperation.[59] What has changed is the basis for cooperation, from development policy to trade policy. Under the plan, Europe views Africa as an equal partner.[60] According to the Nairobi-based economist Mathias Okwemo, 'The Marshall Plan [with Africa] is a very unique and different model that changes the way of doing business, from making Africans mere receivers to being partners with a view to empowering them and giving them a chance to increase their participation in international trade'.[61] Several initiatives focusing on support for Africa had been presented prior to this plan, and they achieved limited success.[62] So why is the MPA thought to be different?

The plan openly acknowledges the responsibility of the industrial nations for both unfair trade and tax avoidance.[63] It mentions that Europe has aligned its Africa policy with short-term economic and trade interests and that it is necessary to reshape cooperation with African countries.[64] Second, the plan stipulates that

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58 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Africa and Europe*.

59 Ibid.

60 G. Müller, 'Marshallplan mit Afrika', interview, *Hanns Seidl Stiftung*, 4 June 2018.

61 B. Koigi, 'Africa Has Mixed Reaction to Germany's "Marshall Plan" Proposal', *Euractiv*, updated 8 December 2016.

62 O. Adeleke, 'The German Marshall Plan With Africa: The Magic Bullet for African Development?', *Medium*, 17 February 2018.

63 Schonecke, *Marshall Plan and Compact With Africa*.

64 See also A. Jung, 'Guter Plan oder schlechter Witz?', *Medico International*, 16 May 2018.

European companies need to comply with environmental and social standards in Africa, and that illegal financial flows have to be halted.[65] The main areas of focus in the new plan are fair trade, more private investment and a more bottom-up approach to economic development. According to the German government, European countries need to contribute by offering knowledge, innovation and technology.[66]

The private sector needs to play a leading role in creating long-term employment opportunities. Instead of more subsidies, Africa needs private investment.[67] Africa is a market with great potential. To date, however, only around 1,000 of the 400,000 internationally active German companies are active on the continent. The MPA wants to change this and intends to bring growth and jobs, but also new training positions.[68] The African Development Bank could play a leading role in this regard and help mobilise resources.[69]

More aid does not necessarily lead to less migration

Driving private-sector growth on the African continent is also the priority for the European Investment Bank (EIB). For example, Boost Africa is a joint initiative of the African Development Bank and the EIB. It seeks to increase the continent's potential and create more opportunities on the ground.[70] Furthermore, under the leadership of the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the EIB signed in January 2020 four guarantee agreements worth €216 million that will help unlock €2 billion to invest in renewables, urban infrastructure and startups in Africa and other countries neighbouring on the EU. These guarantees should help mobilise *and* attract public and private investments.[71] Some analysts argue that, in the long run, stepping up private investment and shifting away from conventional ODA could also help decrease migration to Europe.[72] Private investment would be beneficial for Africa and for Europe as well. However, Europe is not the only actor that has been deepening its engagement in

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65 Ibid.

66 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Africa and Europe*.

67 Ibid.

68 G. Müller, 'Zukunftskontinent Afrika', *kreuz-und-quer.de*, 11 February 2019.

69 G. Müller, 'Eckpunkte für einen Marshallplan mit Afrika – Neue Partnerschaft für Entwicklung, Frieden und Zukunft', speech at the African Development Bank, Abidjan, 2 March 2017.

70 European Investment Bank, 'Boost Africa: Empowering Young African Entrepreneurs' (2019).

71 European Commission, 'Africa–Europe Alliance: Four New Financial Guarantees Worth €216 Million Signed Under the EU External Investment Plan', Press release (22 January 2020).

72 Müller, 'Eckpunkte für einen Marshallplan mit Afrika'.

Africa. Between 2000 and 2017, China extended €130 billion in loans to African governments and their state-owned enterprises.[73]

What is new about the MPA?

Europe is trying to launch a fresh start with Africa. And for its part, Africa is interested in things changing. This can be seen in the efforts of the reform-minded politicians who outlined Africa's own vision of its future in Agenda 2063. Africa's policymakers have committed themselves to increasingly supporting democracy, the rule of law and economic reforms. They are aware of the need to fight the corruption that is devouring the continent.[74] As one of Africa's main partners, Europe should support these commitments. The MPA highlights the importance of supporting Agenda 2063 and stepping up development cooperation with those partners who are implementing reforms aimed at good governance and human rights protection.[75] In all this, the least developed countries must not be left behind.[76]

The plan also presents a new view of ODA, which is perceived not as the sole solution for the challenges but more as a facilitator and promoter of private investment. It is the African countries themselves who should actively mobilise more domestic revenues. This could take the form of, among others, higher tax receipts.[77] International tax havens need to be eliminated by applying pressure on international financial markets and banks.[78]

Criticism of the MPA

Most African representatives have responded positively to the MPA.[79] Leaders of several African states see the focus on economic cooperation as an opportunity and welcome the idea that both continents are seen as equal partners. The President of the African Development Bank, Akinwumi Ayodeji Adesina, sees

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73 H. Timmis and M. Gavas, 'What Does China's Investment in Africa Mean for Europe?', *Center for Global Development*, 14 November 2019.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 M. Müller, 'Der Marshallplan der Bundesregierung aus afrikanischer Sicht', *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, 15 February 2017.

the plan as having a good deal of potential and as offering the possibility of facilitating development and reducing both youth unemployment and the currently high poverty rates.[80]

On the other hand, some opponents say that the plan is not as good as it claims to be.[81] Initially, there was considerable controversy over the name of the plan.[82] 'Marshall Plan With Africa', which derives from the name of the US Marshall Plan, is viewed negatively by some African leaders as the situation in Africa is very different from that in Western Europe after the Second World War.[83] At that time, the countries of Western Europe had functioning administrations and judicial systems, but the same cannot be said for several countries in present-day Africa.[84] Sub-Saharan African economies represent around 3% of the world's GDP, while in the 1940s the combined GDP of Western Europe accounted for 30% of global GDP.[85] According to political analyst Wolfgang Pusztai, the financial support offered by the US Marshall Plan for Europe far surpassed what the MPA is offering Africans.[86]

Further, certain experts[87] have criticised the plan, saying that, despite its good intentions, it ignores the great differences between the countries on the continent.[88] Africa is made up of 54 countries, which are home to 44 different currencies. At the present time 11 armed conflicts are raging. The population is growing rapidly, and as a result, poverty continues to rise.[89] The plan lacks concrete proposals for individual countries, proposals that are based on these countries' specific political and social environments.[90] It does not explain how the plan would be tailored to the 54 countries. Christoph Kannengiesser, managing director of Afrika Verein, has commented, 'Unfortunately the Marshall Plan remains unspecific on how the concrete measures and instruments will look like.'[91] During a meeting with the board members of the African Development Bank, Germany faced criticism

80 Ibid.

81 Jung, 'Guter Plan oder schlechter Witz?'; N. Nielsen, 'Germany Details Its "Marshall Plan" for Africa', *EUobserver*, 19 January 2017.

82 P. Sandner, 'Deutschlands Marshallplan – Afrikas Skepsis', *Deutsche Welle*, 14 November 2016.

83 Beyers et al., *Migration, Nachhaltigkeit und ein Marshall Plan mit Afrika*.

84 F. Knauß, 'Entwicklungshilfe sollte sich auf Bildung konzentrieren', *Wirtschaftswoche*, 10 January 2019.

85 M. Jerven, 'A Marshall Plan for Africa?', *TRT World*, 27 September 2018.

86 W. Pusztai, interview by the author, 2 July 2019.

87 Koigi, 'Africa Has Mixed Reaction to Germany's "Marshall Plan" Proposal'.

88 Morazan and Knoke, *Der Marshallplan mit Afrika*.

89 Ibid.

90 Müller, 'Der Marshallplan der Bundesregierung aus afrikanischer Sicht'.

91 Cited in Nielsen, 'Germany Details Its "Marshall Plan" for Africa'.

about specific features of the plan. Questions were raised about the lack of detail, and there was criticism of the trade barriers that many African businesses would still face. The plan should go into detail on how to address the future of trade between Germany and the nations of Africa.[92] Moreover, the 34-page document[93] also lacks details on how the plan should be implemented: it merely contains an outline of the main steps.[94] The plan also fails to specify time frames for the completion of the measures proposed.[95]

The method of financing is also not spelled out clearly. According to the BMZ, the financing method is new and effective. However, Germany has not clearly committed itself to financing the plan. Doubts have been expressed about the idea of raising funding from different projects, as this method of financing would depend on the specific plans and objectives of the organisations involved.[96]

First tentative results

Despite the mixed opinions on the MPA, it has already achieved certain initial concrete results. For example, the government of Ghana has, with German support, started programmes aimed at bringing the country's fiscal, financial and budgetary systems into compliance with the principles of good governance. In Morocco the building of the world's biggest solar power plant has been launched and will provide energy for a large section of the population. In Egypt the biggest wind farm in Africa is being constructed to give 700,000 Egyptians access to electricity. Moreover, agricultural and food industries in African countries are being promoted via 14 green innovation centres.

To help increase the number of skilled workers, the BMZ has developed the Skills Initiative for Africa, which is aimed at improving vocational training, especially for women in Kenya, Tunisia, Nigeria, Cameroon and South Africa. The plan is to expand the initiative into 15 more countries.

In Germany the Agency for Business and Economic Development is the central point of contact for companies that want to get involved in developing emerging economies. The BMZ has initiated a programme called 'develoPPP.de', which

[92] P. Arrasmith, 'Into Africa: Germany's Proposed Marshall Plan', *Harvard Political Review*, 31 March 2017.

[93] Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Africa and Europe*.

[94] T. Daear, *An Analysis of the Marshall Plan with Africa: Will It Be Possible?* (2017).

[95] A. Adeyeye, 'In Defence of Germany's Marshall Plan with Africa', *How We Made It in Africa*, 7 February 2017.

[96] Daear, *An Analysis of the Marshall Plan with Africa*.

promotes development partnerships with the private sector in Africa. Thus far, more than 100 projects have been launched. For the purposes of this programme, the BMZ has made available more than €325 million, and companies have provided more than €560 million.[97]

Final remarks on development aid and conditionality

Combating irregular migration does feature as a goal of the MPA. Its innovative approach—the involvement of African partners and its intention to use the EU Migration Partnership Framework (MPF)[98] as a means to expand partnerships with Africa—might improve EU–Africa cooperation when it comes to readmissions and the fight against irregular migration.

The MPF was set up under the European Agenda on Migration to enhance cooperation with third countries and to establish a well-managed migration and mobility policy.[99] Five African countries have shown willingness to sign agreements within this framework: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.[100] The European Commission hopes that the MPF will be able to reduce irregular migration to Europe, that is, to reduce the number of arrivals and to facilitate the return of migrants already in Europe. To date, most of the funding for the MPF has come from the EUTF: €500 million has been provided in this way, specifically for the five MPF countries.[101]

The MPA could replace some of the existing EU-level policies which lack impact because they are viewed critically in Africa itself.[102] The plan could have a positive effect on cooperation between the two continents. In particular, it has the potential to form the basis for deeper cooperation between the EU and those countries that were sceptical towards previous EU proposals. The MPA could even increase the leverage of the EU in signing partnership agreements with African countries. According to Martin Hofmann, the plan could be successful if it provides ‘credible offers in size and duration’ and if its positive economic

97 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *A Marshall Plan With Africa* (2017).

98 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Africa and Europe*.

99 Koch, Weber and Werenfels (eds.), *Profiteers of Migration?*

100 Ibid.

101 C. Castillejo, *The EU Migration Partnership Framework: Time for a Rethink?*, German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 28/2017 (Bonn, 2017).

102 Ibid.

outcomes outweigh the negative outcomes, such as the loss of remittances from those who could migrate but decide not to.[103]

African countries are often unwilling to finalise migration deals with the EU due to the huge amounts they receive in the form of remittances, which are frequently a greater source of national income than development assistance itself.[104] According to the World Bank, remittances account for significant percentages of the GDP in several African countries: in Mali they represent 6.3% of GDP; in Senegal, 13.9%; and in Gambia, 22.4%. For many developing countries ODA seems to be less beneficial in the long run than remittances.[105]

Emigration can be beneficial for the Maghreb states and Sub-Saharan Africa as it reduces pressure on labour markets. It represents a development resource and is in their economic and political interests.[106] (On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the problem of brain drain from Africa.) The MPA takes the problem of remittances into account and is not offering conventional ODA. It is instead pressing Africa to become more active and mobilise considerably more domestic revenues, and to use ODA to leverage private investment. This would generate more financial resources than the ODA approach and make remittances less attractive.[107]

Another reason for third countries' scepticism towards the MPF is that it does not acknowledge the interests of African countries in relation to migration. This has hampered the dialogue with the EU's African partners.[108] This was the very reason for the lack of progress in cooperation with Nigeria, Senegal and Mali.[109] An attempt is currently being made to find a compromise on the issue. This is where the MPA, with its emphasis on mutual cooperation, could provide a new perspective. The plan presents a new approach in EU–Africa relations and openly acknowledges the need for an equal partnership. The official document mentions this intention several times: 'Our cooperation with Africa is based on values and guided by common interests'.[110] And again, 'Germany and Europe must now

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103 M. Hofmann, interview by the author, 2 July 2019.

104 L. Scazzieri and J. Springford, *How the EU and Third Countries Can Manage Migration*, Centre for European Reform (2017).

105 Funk et al., *Tackling Irregular Migration Through Development*.

106 H. De Haas, *The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of African Migration to Europe*, International Migration Institute (2008).

107 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Africa and Europe*.

108 Castillejo, *The EU Migration Partnership Framework*.

109 Ibid.

110 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Africa and Europe*, 7.

listen to what African countries are saying'.[111] The plan has the potential to give the impetus needed to establish mutual dialogue.

A further issue slowing down cooperation between the two continents is the already discussed use of conditionality. To some extent the MPF itself attaches conditions to aid—the criticisms of certain EU representatives notwithstanding. The five quarterly MPF progress reports repeatedly stress the use of 'rewards' and 'consequences' to ensure partners' cooperation in the area of returns and readmission.[112] This approach has been shown to hinder cooperation with third countries—in many cases it has turned out to be more of an obstacle than an asset.[113]

It is important to note that the matter of conditionality can be twofold, since third countries can also formulate the conditions under which they are willing to collaborate with the EU. Morocco and Turkey, for example, clearly stated the conditions under which they were willing to serve as 'gate-keepers' for the EU. This phenomenon is called 'reversed conditionality'.[114] Both forms of conditionality have come under a good deal of criticism. According to the political scientist El Qadim, conditionality is 'paternalistic, unfair, and contemptuous' and should therefore be avoided.[115]

For its part, the MPA does not support the conditionality approach. This has been made clear by Gerd Müller, the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development (Christian Social Union in Bavaria, Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU). He has urged that migration-related conditions should not be attached to the provision of development aid as this would further aggravate the situation of refugees in crisis regions and in the long run increase the number of migrants on the move, which would not serve European interests.[116] As even the European Commission has argued, Europe should focus on creating enhanced legal migration paths, and fighting irregular migration and smuggling, all of which are included in the plan. Appropriate incentives, through visa policy, to improve the negotiations on readmission agreements would present a positive way forward.

111 Ibid., 5.

112 Castillejo, *The EU Migration Partnership Framework: Time for a Rethink?*, 6.

113 European Commission, *Fifth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework With Third Countries Under the European Agenda on Migration*, Report, COM (2017) 471 final (6 September 2017).

114 L. Laube, 'The Relational Dimension of Externalizing Border Control: Selective Visa Policies in Migration and Border Diplomacy', *Comparative Migration Studies* 7/29 (2019); J. Cassarino, 'Informalizing EU Readmission Policy', in A. Ripoll Servent and F. Trauner (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Justice and Home Affairs Research* (London: Routledge, 2018).

115 N. El Qadim, 'EU–Morocco Negotiations on Migrations and the Decentring Agenda in EU Studies', *E-International Relations*, 24 June 2017.

116 Müller, 'Marshallplan mit Afrika'.

Conclusion

Africa will continue to be the poorest continent in the world, with its GDP per capita remaining €7,300 below the world average in the upcoming years.[117] However, with the proper approach, things could change radically. The continent has many strengths. Of its 54 nations, 20 are listed amongst the world's fastest growing economies, and by 2035 Africa should have the biggest workforce in the world.[118] The MPA promises a fresh start in EU–African relations. It introduces suitable approaches that have been welcomed by many African politicians, thus giving an impetus for better cooperation. However, a lot will depend on how the MPA is communicated to the EU's African partners and how it will be implemented. The plan generated great excitement in 2017 and presenting the plan at the G20 summit was a good start. But the effort to keep the plan alive has to be sustained, and the German government has to stay committed to its aims. On the other hand, Europe is not the only one responsible for the fate of the initiative. It is now up to the African governments to implement reforms and fight corruption, and to make administrations, customs formalities and establishing start-ups efficient. The plan is a step in the right direction. It could lead to more reform-oriented partnerships with African countries and generate the needed resources.[119] Africa has to become more willing to compromise and cooperate.[120] And for its part, Europe needs to support the continent, because in a globalising world, it can only benefit from a successful Africa.[121]

Recommendations

- To maintain a good relationship with Africa, the EU needs to keep the continent high on its agenda. Regular meetings with the African Union are a step in the right direction, but long-term, sustainable ties between the two sides should be maintained.[122]

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117 A. Carmona, 'A Marshall Plan for Africa Won't Help Africans; Free Trade Will', *Acton Institute*, 20 November 2017.

118 Adeleke, 'The German Marshall Plan With Africa'.

119 Müller, 'Zukunftskontinent Afrika'.

120 A. Ndakoze, 'Kein Marshallplan für Afrika!', *Deutschlandfunk Kultur*, 13 June 2017.

121 Global Marshall Plan Foundation, *Marshall Plan mit Afrika* (2016).

122 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Africa and Europe*.

- To decrease migration, the focus should be on creating legal pathways and fighting smuggling and irregular migration.

- The EU should carefully consider whether the provision of development aid should be tied to the implementation of migration-related policies, weighing the need to maintain a comprehensive partnership with Africa against the EU's migration policy objectives. While the debate has not yet been settled, our current understanding of the matter suggests that, in the long term, migration-related development aid conditionality generally hampers cooperation with third countries.

- Development aid should be directed towards improving the quality of public services, social infrastructure and good governance. All these measures would help decrease migration.[123]

- Private investment should contribute to sustainable development. The EU needs to mobilise and promote investments that have long-term, cross-sectoral and climate-friendly objectives.[124]

- For the MPA to be successful, detailed information needs to be provided on how it is to be implemented and on the time frames for the specific activities.

[123] Arroyo, *Using Aid to Address the Root Causes of Migration and Refugee Flows*.

[124] A. Rudolph and S. Holzapfel, 'The Marshall Plan with Africa – Looking Ahead to the Principles of Development Effectiveness', German Development Institute, *The Current Column* (Bonn, 2017).

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